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Abstract We design a double-or-quits game to compare the speed of learn-
ing one’s specific ability with the speed of rising confidence as the task gets
increasingly difficult. We find that people on average learn to be overconfident
faster than they learn their true ability and we present an Intuitive-Bayesian
model of confidence which integrates confidence biases and learning. Uncer-
tainty about one’s true ability to perform a task in isolation can be responsible
for large and stable confidence biases, namely limited discrimination, the hard-
easy effect, the Dunning-Kruger effect, conservative learning from experience
and the overprecision phenomenon (without underprecision) if subjects act as
Bayesian learners who rely only on sequentially perceived performance cues
and contrarian illusory signals induced by doubt. Moreover, these biases are
likely to persist since the Bayesian aggregation of past information consol-
idates the accumulation of errors and the perception of contrarian illusory
signals generates conservatism and under-reaction to events. Taken together,
these two features may explain why intuitive Bayesians make systematically
wrong predictions of their own performance.
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1 Introduction
In many circumstances, people appear to be "overconfident" in their own abil-
ities and good fortune. This may occur when they compare themselves with
others, massively finding themselves "better-than-average" in familiar domains
(eg., Svenson 1981, Kruger 1999), when they overestimate their own absolute
ability to perform a task (eg., Lichtenstein and Fischhoff 1977, Lichtenstein
et al 1982), or when they overestimate the precision of their estimates and
forecasts (eg., Oskamp 1965). Moore and Healy (2008) designate these three
forms of overconfidence respectively as overplacement, overestimation, and
overprecision. We shall here be concerned with how people overestimate, or
sometimes underestimate, their own absolute ability to perform a task in iso-
lation. Remarkably, however, our explanation of the estimation bias predicts
the overprecision phenomenon as well.
The estimation bias refers to the discrepancy between ex post objective per-
formance (measured by frequency of success in a task) with ex ante subjectively
held confidence (Lichtenstein et al, 1982). It has first been interpreted as a cog-
nitive bias caused by the difficulty of the task (e.g.,Griffin and Tversky 1992).
It is the so called "hard-easy effect" (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977): people
underestimate their ability to perform an easy task and overestimate their abil-
ity to perform a difficult task. However, a recent literature has challenged this
interpretation by seeking to explain the apparent over/underconfidence by the
rational-Bayesian calculus of individuals discovering their own ability through
experience and learning (Moore and Healy, 2008, Grieco and Hogarth, 2009,
Benoît and Dubra, 2011, Van den Steen, 2011). While the cognitive bias view
describes self-confidence as a stable trait, the Bayesian learning perspective
points at the experiences leading to over- or under-confidence. The primary
goal of this paper is to propose a parsimonious integration of the cognitive
bias and the learning approach.
We design a real-effort experiment which enables us to test the respective
strengths of estimation biases and learning. People enter a game in which
the task becomes increasingly difficult -i.e. risky- over time. By comparing,
for three levels of difficulty, the subjective probability of success (confidence)
with the objective frequency at three moments before and during the task, we
examine the speed of learning one’s ability for this task and the persistence
of overconfidence with experience. We conjecture that subjects will be first
underconfident when the task is easy and become overconfident when the task
is getting difficult. However, "difficulty" is a relative notion and a task that
a low-ability individual finds difficult may look easy to a high-ability person.
Thus, we should observe that overconfidence declines with ability and rises
with difficulty. The question raised here is the following: if people have initially
an imperfect knowledge of their ability and miscalibrate their estimates, will
their rising overconfidence as the task becomes increasingly difficult be offset
by learning, and will they learn their true ability fast enough to stop the game
before it is too late?
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The popular game "double or quits" fits the previous description and will
thus inspire the following experiment. A modern version of this game is the
world-famous TV show "who wants to be a millionaire". In the games of "dou-
ble or quits" and "who wants to be a millionaire", players are first given a
number of easy questions to answer so that most of them win a small prize.
At this point, they have an option to quit with their prize or double by pursu-
ing the game and answering a few more questions of increasing difficulty. The
same sort of double or quits decision may be repeated several times in order
to allow enormous gains in case of repeated success. However, if the player
fails to answer one question, she must step out of the game with a consolation
prize of lower value than the prize that she had previously declined.
Our experimental data reproduces the double or quits game. We observe
that subjects are under-confident in front of a novel but easy task, whereas
they feel overconfident and willing to engage in tasks of increasing difficulty
to the point of failing.
We propose a new model of "intuitive Bayesian learning" to interpret the
data and draw new testable implications. Our model builds on ideas put for-
ward by Erev et al (1994) and Moore and Healy (2008). It is Bayesian like
Moore and Healy (2008), while viewing confidence as a subjective probability
of success, like Erev et al (1994). However, it introduces intuitive rationality
to overcome a limitation of the rational-Bayesian framework which is to de-
scribe how rational people learn from experience without being able to predict
the formation of confidence biases before completion of a task. This is not an
innocuous limitation because it means, among other things, that the rational-
Bayesian theory is inconsistent with the systematic probability distortions
observed in decisions under risk or uncertainty since the advent of prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Therefore, we need to go deeper into
the cognitive process of decision. Subjects in our view derive their beliefs exclu-
sively from their prior and the informative signals that they receive. However,
"intuitive Bayesians" decide on the basis of the sensory evidence that they per-
ceive sequentially. If they feel uncertain of their prior belief, they will perceive
the objection to it triggered by their doubt and wish to "test" its strength
before making their decision, like those decision makers weighting the pros
and cons of an option. The perceived objection to a rational prior acts like a
contrarian illusory signal that causes probability distortions in opposition to
the prior and this is a cognitive mechanism that does not require completion
of the task. As they gain experience, they keep on applying Bayes rule to up-
date their prior belief both by cues on their current performance and by the
prior-dependent contrarian signal.Thus, with the single assumption of intuitive
rationality, we can account for all the cognitive biases described on our data
within the Bayesian paradigm and integrate the cognitive bias and the learning
approach. With this model, and in contrast with Gervais and Odean (2001),
we don’t need to assume a self-attribution bias (Langer and Roth, 1975, Miller
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and Ross, 1975) combined with Bayesian learning to produce overconfidence1.
Signals of future success and failure are treated symmetrically2. Finally, un-
like models of confidence management (e.g. Brunnermeier and Parker 2005,
Köszegi 2006, Mobius et al 2014), we don’t have to postulate that individuals
manipulate their beliefs and derive direct utility from optimistic beliefs about
themselves.
Section 2 lays down the structure of the experiment and incentives, and
provides the basic descriptive statistics. Our large data set allows a thorough
description of confidence biases and a dynamic view of their evolution with
experience of the task. Section 3 describes the confidence biases and learning
shown by our data. Four basic facts about confidence are reported from our
data: (i) limited discrimination among different tasks; (ii) miscalibration of
subjective probabilities of success elicited by the "hard-easy effect"; (iii) dif-
ferential, ability-dependent, calibration biases known as the Dunning-Kruger
(or ability) effect (Kruger and Dunning, 1999); and (iv) local, but not global,
learning. Section 4 proposes a new theory of over (under)-confidence among
intuitive Bayesians which integrates doubt and learning and can predict bi-
ases, before as well as during the task, in repeated as well as in single trials.
Doubt-driven miscalibration appears to be a sufficient explanation, not only
for the hard-easy effect and the ’ability’ or Dunning-Kruger effect, but also
for limited discrimination and for the overprecision phenomenon. The theory
is further used in section 5 to predict the evolution of confidence over expe-
rience on our data set. For instance, low-ability subjects first lose confidence
when they discover their low performance during the first and easiest level;
but they eventually regain their initial confidence in own ability to perform
more difficult tasks in the future after laborious but successful completion of
the first level. Intuitive Bayesians exhibit conservatism, that is, under-reaction
to received information, and slow learning. Finally, we show in sub-section 5.3
that the cues upon which subjects construct their own estimate of success, i.e.
confidence, widely differ from the genuine predictors of success, which further
explains the planning fallacy3. The conclusion follows in section 6.
1 Using German survey data about stock market forecasters, Deaves et al (2010) does not
confirm that success has a greater impact than failure on self-confidence, which casts doubt
on the self-attribution bias explanation.
2 In studies where subjects are free to stay or to leave after a negative feedback, subjects
who update most their confidence in their future success to a negative feedback are selectively
sorted out of the sample. This creates an asymmetry in measured responses to positive
and negative feedback. Such spurious asymmetry does not exist in the present experiment,
because subjects who fail to reach one level must drop out of the game.
3 The planning fallacy is the tendency to underestimate the time needed for completion
of a task. See, e.g. Buehler et al (2002).
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2 The experiment
2.1 Task and treatments
Participants perform a real-effort, rather long and difficult, task for which
they get paid according to their degree of success. The task consists in solving
anagrams ranked in three levels of increasing difficulty. It is performed during a
maximum of 15 rounds lasting no more than 8 minutes each. These 15 rounds
are structured in three successive levels of increasing difficulty, designated
respectively as the training level, the middle level, and the high level.
Participants are successful at one level when they manage to decode 2/3
of the anagrams at this level. An example of the task screen is reproduced
in appendix. The training level consists of 9 rounds of low difficulty (i.e. 6
anagrams per round to be solved in no more than eight minutes). It is long
enough to let participants feel that a large effort and ability is required of
them to succeed at the optional upper levels. It does also let them ample time
to learn the task. The middle and high levels, which come next, comprise 3
rounds each.
The gradient of task difficulty was manipulated after completion of the
training level and two conditions are available: (i) in the ’wall’ condition, the
difficulty jumps sharply at middle level, but remains constant at high level;
(ii) in the ’hill’ condition, the difficulty always rises from one level to the next,
slowly first at middle level, then sharply at high level.
By the end of the experiment, the required number of anagrams is the same
for the ’wall’ and ’hill’ conditions. However, the distribution of anagrams to
be decoded differs for these two conditions. In the wall condition, ten anagrams
per round are proposed at the middle and high levels, of which 20 anagrams
at least must be decoded per level. In the hill condition, eight anagrams per
round are proposed at middle level, and this rises to twelve anagrams at high
level. Decoding sixteen anagrams in three rounds is required for middle level;
and decoding twenty-four anagrams in three rounds is required for high level.
This design can be visualized in Figure 1. The same figure appears (without
the legends) on the screen before each round4.
The manipulation of the ’wall’ and ’hill’ conditions gave rise to three treat-
ments:
– Wall treatment (wall): the wall condition is imposed to participants who
passed the training level;
– Hill treatment (hill): the hill condition is imposed to participants who
passed the training level;
– Choice treatment (choice): a choice among the two conditions (wall or hill)
is proposed to participants who passed the training level.
The double or quits game is played under these three treatments. All sub-
jects first go through the training level. Those who were successful -i.e., those
4 The screen highlights the round, the number of correct anagrams cumulated during the
current level and the number of anagrams needed to pass this level.
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Fig. 1 Decision problem perceived by participants at the start of level 2 of the choice
treatment.
Notes:
Payoffs in parentheses : (fail, success and stop).
Decisions I, II and III are conditioned to success in the previous level.
Decision II depends on the treatment.
Estimation of Confidence After is conditioned to success in the first and decision to start the
second level.
who solved at least 36 anagrams during the training level- will then be asked
to double or quits:
– Double: Continue to the next level to win a substantial increase in earn-
ings;
– Quits: Stop the experiment and take your earnings.
Participants who decide to go to middle level get a consolation prize that
is lower than the foregone earnings if they fail or drop out before the third
round. If they succeed middle level, they will be asked again to double or quits.
The same rules apply for high level at rising levels of earnings. The potential
gains (in Euros) were (10, 2) at the training level, that is, 10e for successful
quitters and 2e for failures, (14, 4) at middle level, and (26, 11) at high level.
2.2 Experimental sessions
We ran 24 sessions for a total of 410 participants, half for the choice treatment
and the other half equally split between the ’wall’ and ’hill’ treatments. Eight
sessions were run in the BULCIRANO lab (Center for Interuniversity Research
and Analysis on Organizations), Montreal (Canada), and the same number of
sessions were conducted at the LEEP (Laboratoire d’Economie Expérimentale
de Paris), Pantheon-Sorbonne University. The difference between Paris and
Montreal was observed to be insignificant. Thus, eight additional sessions were
conducted at LEEP in order to acquire robust results. A show-up fee of 5e in
Paris and Can$ 5 in Montreal was paid to the participants (from now on, all
money amounts will be given in Euros). About 80% of the participants were
students.
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At the start, instructions were read out and a hard copy of it was also
provided individually. Participants answered six questions to test their full
comprehension of the experiment. Information on gender, age, educational
level and labor market status was required. The last question was a hypothet-
ical choice between 5e for sure and an ambiguous urn containing 100 balls of
two colors (white and black) in unknown proportions. Ten Euros (10e) were
to be earned if a black ball was drawn. Choice of the sure gain provided a
rough but simple measure of risk aversion in the uncertainty context of the
experiment.
2.3 Descriptive statistics
The main descriptive statistics for the three treatments are reported in Table
1:
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the three treatments
Treatments
Variables Wall Hill Choice
Male 56% 48% 49%
Age 24.5 25.8 25.1
Risk Averse 54% 59% 51%
Payments 9.1 8.9 7.8
Total anagrams solved 55.6 53.7 54.3
Ability5 2.8 2.7 2.6
Number of observations 101 106 203
Decision to double conditional on success at previous level:
Middle level 78% (91) 76% (90) 77% (176)
High level 95% (22) 72% (29) 82% (34)
Notes: Decision to double to High level: difference between the "Wall"
and "Hill" treatments is significant at 5%; all other differences are not
significant at 10% level (t-test). Number of participants successfully
clearing the previous level is in parentheses.
The results of tests show that the three samples are homogeneous. No sig-
nificant difference is observed among the samples’ means for individual charac-
teristics. As expected, the ’wall ’ and ’hill’ treatments had a substantial impact
on the decision to double upon reaching the middle level. Almost everybody
doubles in the ’wall’ treatment on reaching middle level because the high level
is no more difficult than the middle level. In contrast, only 72% enter the high
level in the ’hill’ treatment as the difficulty gradient is very steep (t-test: t=
2.20; p-value=0.033). In spite of these differences, the number of anagrams
solved and payments may be considered equal among treatments at the usual
level of significance.
5 Ability is measured by the number of anagrams solved per minute in the first 4 rounds.
It lies in the interval [0,6].
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Subjects can also be grouped in three different levels of ability, according to
the number of anagrams solved per minute in the first 4 rounds: high ability
(first tercile), medium ability (second tercile) and low ability (last tercile).
Some descriptive statistics for the three treatments are reported on Table 2.
The three groups are homogeneous in terms of gender and risk aversion but a
slightly greater proportion of low-ability subjects can be found among older,
probably non-student, participants.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics by ability level
Level of ability Difference
Variables High Medium Low M-H L-M L-H
Male 47% 54% 50% ns ns ns
Age 23.6 24.5 27.2 ns *** ***
Risk Aversion 53% 50% 59% ns ns ns
Payments 11.7 7.7 6.0 *** ** ***
Number anagrams solved 67.7 53.8 42.6 *** *** ***
Ability 4.5 2.4 1.1 *** *** ***
Number of observations 131 142 137
Decision to double conditional on success at previous level:
Middle level 91% (128) 81% (127) 54% (102) ** *** ***
High level 87% (55) 72% (25) 80% (5) * ns ns
Notes: Significance level: * 10%; ** 5%; ***1%; ns: not significant at 10% level (t-test). Number
of participants successfully clearing the previous level is in parentheses
Table 2 shows that "ability" strongly discriminates among participants in
terms of performance (total anagrams solved, payments) and quits before the
middle level. However, the training level was meant to be easy enough that
three-quarters (102:137) of low-ability subjects would pass it.
2.4 Confidence judgments
Participants were asked to state their subjective probability of success for
the three levels and at three moments: before, during, and after the training
level. Before beginning the game, they were shown a demonstration slide which
lasted one minute. Anagrams of the kind they would have to solve appeared on
the screen with their solution. Then, they were asked to assess their chances
of success on a scale of 0 to 100 (Adams, 1957), and the game started for real.
After four rounds of decoding anagrams, players were asked again to rate their
confidence. Lastly, players who had passed the training level and decided to
double re-estimated their chances of success for the middle and high levels.
The Adams’s (1957) scale that we used is convenient for quantitative anal-
ysis because it converts confidence into (almost) continuous subjective proba-
bilities. It was required for consistency that the reported chances of success do
not increase as the difficulty level increased. Answers could not be validated
as long as they remained inconsistent. Subjects actually used the whole scale
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but, before the experiment, 14% expressed absolute certainty that they would
succeed the first level and only 1 participant was sure that she would fail.
We did not directly incentivize beliefs because our primary aim was not
to force subjects to make optimal forecasts of their chances of success but to
have them report sincerely their true beliefs in their attempt to maximize their
subjective expected utility, and to observe the variation of such beliefs with
experience. The true beliefs are those which dictate actual behavior following
such prediction, and the latter was incentivized by the money gains based on
subjects’ decisions to double or quits and performance in the task. Armantier
and Treich (2013) have recently generalized previous work on proper scoring
rules (see their extensive bibliography). They show that, when subjects have a
financial stake in the events they are predicting and can hedge their predictions
by taking additional action after reporting their beliefs, use of any proper scor-
ing rule generates complex distortions in the predictions and further behavior
since these are not independent and are in general different from what they
would have been if each had been decided separately. In the present context,
final performance yields income and does not immediately follow the forecast.
Hence, incentivizing forecasts might force subjects to try and adjust gradually
their behavior to their forecast and, therefore, unduly condition their behavior.
A further difficulty encountered in this experiment was that, by incentivizing
beliefs on three successive occasions, we induced risk-averse subjects to diver-
sify their reported estimates as a hedge against the risk of prediction error.
Self-report methods have been widely used and validated by psychologists
and neuroscientists; and recent careful comparisons of this method with the
quadratic scoring rule6 found that it performed as well (Clark and Friesen,
2009) or better (Hollard et al, 2015) than the quadratic scoring rule7. Con-
sidering that self-reports perform nicely while being much simpler and faster
than incentive-compatible rules, use of the self-report seemed appropriate in
this experiment.
3 Describing confidence biases and learning
3.1 Limited Discrimination
About half of our subjects were selected randomly into the ’wall’ and ’hill’
treatments and could not choose between the two. Those selected in one path
were informed of the characteristics of their own path but had no knowledge
6 After the subject has reported a probability p, the quadratic scoring rule imposes a cost
that is proportional to (1−p)2 in case of success and to (0−p)2 in case of failure. The score
takes the general form: S = a− b. Cost, with a, b > 0.
7 The second study also included the lottery rule in the comparison and found that the
latter slightly outperformed self-report. The lottery rule rests on the following mechanism:
after the subject has reported a probability p, a random number q is drawn. If q is smaller
than p, the subject is paid according to the task. If q is greater than p, the subject is paid
according to a risky bet that provides the same reward with probability q. The lottery rule
cannot be implemented on our design.
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whatsoever of the characteristics, nor even the existence, of the other path.
Result 1 (Limited discrimination): Subjects do not perceive differences of dif-
ficulty between two different tasks in the future unless such differences are
particularly salient. Moreover, they are not forward-looking, in the sense that
they are unable to anticipate the increased likelihood of their success at the high
level conditional on passing the middle level. However, they can be sophisticated
when it is time for them to choose.
Support of result 1: Table 3 compares confidence judgments regarding the
three levels of difficulty among the ’wall ’ and the ’hill ’ subjects before, dur-
ing, and after the training period. Although the ’wall ’ and ’hill ’ were designed
to be quite different at the middle and high levels, the subjective estimates of
success exhibit almost no significant difference at any level. The single excep-
tion concerns the early estimate (before round 1) regarding the high level for
which the difference of gradient between the two paths is particularly salient.
However, the difference ceases to be significant as subjects acquire experience
of the task. This striking observation suggests that individuals are unable to
discriminate distinctive characteristics of the task unless the latter are partic-
ularly salient.
Perhaps even more disturbing is the fact that, in Table 3, subjects discount
their confidence level from the middle to the high level as much in the Wall as
in the Hill treatment. For instance, just before the middle level, the ratio of
confidence in passing the high level to confidence in passing the middle level
was close to 0.70 in both treatments. However, a perfectly rational agent should
realize that the high level is no more difficult than the middle level in the Wall
treatment whereas it is much more difficult in the Hill treatment. Thus, she
should report almost the same confidence at both levels in the Wall treatment,
and a considerably lower confidence at the high level in the Hill treatment.
The latter observation suggests that most individuals are unable to compute
conditional probabilities accurately even when the latter is equal to one as
in the Wall treatment. They don’t anticipate that, if they demonstrate the
ability to solve 20 anagrams or more at middle level, they should be almost
sure to solve 20 or more at the high level. However, subjects do make the
right inference when it is time for them to make the decision since 95% of
subjects who passed the middle level in the Wall treatment decided to continue
(Table 1). And, if they have a choice between Wall and Hill, they do make a
difference between these two tracks: 71.4% of doublers then prefer the Wall
track although they would have greater chances of success at the middle level if
they chose Hill. This observation suggests that subjects did not maximize their
immediate probability of success but made a sophisticated comparison of the
expected utility of both tracks, taking the option value of Wall in consideration
before making an irreversible choice of track spanning over two periods8.
8 We are grateful to Luis Santos-Pinto for making the last point clear in early discussions.
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Table 3 A comparison of confidence for the wall and hill treatments shown separately
Subjective confidence No-choice treatment
Wall (%) Hill (%) Difference
Before round 1: Level 1 80 77 ns
Level 2 62 58 ns
Level 3 47 40 **
Before round 5: Level 1 71 71 ns
Level 2 53 52 ns
Level 3 40 36 ns
Before round 10: Level 2 60 56 ns
Level 3 43 39 ns
Notes. Observations: Before rounds 1 and 5 (before round 10): 101 (71) for
wall and 106 (68) for hill. Significance Level: * p < .10, ** p < .05, ***
p < .01, ns: not significant at 10% level.
3.2 Miscalibration
Result 2 (The hard-easy effect): In comparison with actual performance, con-
fidence in one’s ability to reach a given level is underestimated for a novel
but relatively easy task (the training level); and it is overestimated for the
subsequent more difficult tasks (the middle and high levels). Overconfidence
increases in relative terms with the difficulty of the task. Conditional on an
initial success (training level) and on the decision to continue, confidence in
one’s ability to reach higher levels is still overestimated. Thus, initially suc-
cessful subjects remain too optimistic about their future.
Support for result 2: Figure 2 compares the measured frequency of success
with the reported subjective confidence in the three successive levels of in-
creasing difficulty. For the middle and high levels, we also indicate these two
probabilities as they appear before the training period and after it conditional
on doubling. The Choice and No-choice conditions have been aggregated on
this figure because no significant difference was found in the result of tests.
The task required at the training level was relatively easy for our subjects
since 87% passed this level. However, subjects started it without knowing what
it would be like and, even after four rounds of training, they underestimated
their own ability to a low 77% probability of success. The difference among
the two percentages is significant (t=5.77, p=0.000; t-test). Hence, individuals
are under-confident on the novel but relatively easy task.
In contrast, subjects appear to be overconfident as the task gets increas-
ingly difficult. They consistently diminish their estimated probabilities of suc-
cess but do not adjust their estimates in proportion to the difficulty of the task.
Thus, individuals tend to overestimate their own chances for the advanced lev-
els. The difference between the frequency of success and confidence before the
task is always significant, both at the middle level (t=18.3, p=0.000 ) and at
the high level (t=17.1, p=0.000 ).
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Fig. 2 Hard-easy effect observed at three levels
Notes: Observations: before training level (N: 410); after training level (N:
275 - analysis restricted to doublers). Differences between frequency of suc-
cess and confidence (before and after) are significant at 1% at all levels (Train-
ing, Middle and High). (t-test)
The same conclusions hold conditional on passing the training level and
choosing to double. Subjects remain overconfident in their future chances of
success. However, their confidence does not rise after their initial success in
proportion to their chances of further success.
3.3 The ability effect
Result 3 (The ability effect): Overcalibration diminishes with task-specific abil-
ity.
Support for result 3: The hard-easy effect is reproduced on Figures 3a, 3b, 3c
for the three ability terciles9. Low-ability subjects are obviously more over-
confident at middle and high levels relative to high and medium-ability in-
dividuals. This result confirms earlier observations of Kruger and Dunning
(1999) among others (see Ryvkin et al (2012) for a recent overview and incen-
tivized experiments). The so-called Dunning-Kruger effect has been attributed
to a metacognitive inability of the unskilled to recognize their mistakes10. We
9 Difference between confidence and frequency of success is significant at 1% for all ability
levels. For these figures, we selected confidence reported after 4th round (during training
level) in order to minimize the impact of mismeasurement.
10 The Dunning-Kruger effect initially addressed general knowledge questions whereas we
consider self-assessments of own performance in a real-effort task.
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Fig. 3a Under-confidence at the training level, by ability.
Fig. 3b Overconfidence at middle level, by ability.
give here another, and in our opinion, simpler explanation11. The ability (or
Dunning-Kruger) effect may be seen as a corollary of the hard-easy effect be-
cause "difficulty" is a relative notion and a task that a low-ability individual
finds difficult certainly looks easier to a high-ability person. Thus, if overconfi-
dence rises with the difficulty of a task, it is natural to observe that it declines
on a given task with the ability of performers.
11 Our explanation may also be better than the initial explanation such that the unskilled
are unaware of their lower abilities. Miller and Geraci (2011) found that students with
poor abilities showed greater overconfidence than high-performing students, but they also
reported lower confidence in these predictions.
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Fig. 3c Overconfidence at high level, by ability.
3.4 Learning
Result 4 (Learning is local, not global): Confidence and performance co-vary
during the task. Subjects learned locally upon experiencing variations in their
performance. However, they didn’t learn globally in our experiment, since
doublers remained as confident as before after completing the training level
irrespective of their true ability level.
Support for result 4: Figures 4 and 5 describe confidence by ability group
before, during, and after the training period1213 for the middle and high level
respectively whereas Figure 6 describes the variation of performance of the
same groups within the same period. These graphs, taken together, show a
decline in both (ability-adjusted) confidence and performance during the first
four rounds, followed by a concomitant rise of confidence and performance in
the following rounds14. The observed decline of confidence at the beginning
of the training period can be related on Figure 6 to the fact that participants
solved less and less anagrams per period during the first four periods: 5.51 on
average in period 1, 5.18 in period 2, 4.60 in period 3, and 4.17 in period 415.
Subjects kept solving at least two-thirds of the anagrams available during the
12 No significant difference was found between the Choice and No-choice conditions, sug-
gesting that the option to choose the preferred path does not trigger an illusion of control.
13 Participants who reported confidence after the training period were more able than
average since they had passed this level and decided to double. Thus, we compare ability-
adjusted confidence Before and During with the reported confidence After. The ability-
adjusted confidence Before and During are obtained by running a simple linear regression
of confidence Before and During on ability, measured by the average number of anagrams
solved per minute in the first 4 rounds of the training level. The estimated effect of superior
ability of doublers was added to confidence During or Before to get the ability-adjusted
confidence which directly compares with the observed confidence After.
14 With a single exception, confidence variations are statistically significant at 1% level in
the middle and high levels.
15 There was no significant difference between treatments.
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training session but probably lost part of their motivation on repeating the
task. On sequentially observing their declining performance, they revised their
initial estimate of future success downward. However, on being asked to report
their confidence after four rounds, they became conscious of their performance
decline and responded to this information feedback. Performance rose sharply
but momentarily during the next two rounds. The average performance first
rose to 4.37 in period 5 and 5.05 in period 6 then sharply declined to 4.39 in
period 7, 4.06 in period 8 and 3.48 in period 9. As soon as subjects became
(almost) sure of passing the training level, they diminished their effort. During
the experiment it was also observed that individuals stopped decoding further
anagrams as soon as the minimum requirement to clear a level was fulfilled.
Subjects experiencing low (medium) performance in the first rounds seem
to learn locally that they have a low (medium) ability since the confidence gap
widens during the first four periods. However, this learning effect is short-lived
since the confidence gap shrinks back to its initial size after low (medium)-
ability subjects strove to succeed, increasing their performance (as reported on
Figure 6) and regaining confidence. Eventually, experienced "doublers" are as
confident to succeed at higher levels as they were before the task, irrespective
of their ability level: there is no global learning effect. We share the conclusion
of Merkle and Weber (2011) that the persistence of prior beliefs is inconsistent
with fully rational-Bayesian behavior(see also Benoît et al 2015).
Fig. 4 Variation of confidence with experience, by level of ability: middle level
Notes. Sample size: 410 individuals for Before and During, and 275 for After
(only doublers). We report the adjusted ability for doublers, see Footnote 13
for more details. Differences between ability levels are significant at 1%
level Before and During. Differences After are not significant at 10% level.
Differences by ability level: High-ability: During-Before: ***; After-During:
ns; After-Before: ns. Medium-ability: During-Before: ***; After-During: ***;
After-Before:**. Low- ability: During-Before:***; After-During: *** ; After-
Before: ns. Significance level: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%; ns: not significant at
10% level (t-test).
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Fig. 5 Variation of confidence with experience, by level of ability: high level
Notes. Sample size: 410 individuals for Before and During, and 275 for After
(only doublers). We report the adjusted ability for doublers, see Footnote 13
for more details. Differences between ability levels are significant at 1%
level Before and During. Differences After are not significant at 10% level.
Differences by ability level: High-ability: During-Before: ns; After-During:
ns; After-Before: ns. Medium-ability: During-Before: ***; After-During: **;
After-Before: ns. Low-ability: During-Before:***; After-During: *** ; After-
Before: ns.. Significance level: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%; ns: not significant at
10% level (t-test).
Fig. 6 Number of anagrams solved per round by level of ability
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4 Theory
We present now a simple Bayesian model that describes absolute confidence
reported before and during completion of a task, and predicts limited discrimi-
nation, the hard-easy effect and the ability effect. It builds on ideas put forward
by Erev et al (1994) and Moore and Healy (2008) who both consider that con-
fidence, like most judgments, are subject to errors. Erev et al (1994) view
confidence as a subjective probability that must lie between 0 and 1. Hence,
probabilities close to 1 are most likely to be underestimated and probabilities
close to 0 are most likely to be overestimated. The hard-easy effect and the
ability effect may be merely the consequence of that simple truth. However,
their theory offers a qualitative assessment that lacks precision and cannot be
applied to intermediate values of confidence. Moore and Healy (2008) analyze
confidence as a score in a quiz that the player must guess after completion
of the task and before knowing her true performance. Bayesian players adjust
their prior estimate after receiving a subjective signal from their own experi-
ence. It is natural to think that signals are randomly distributed around their
true unknown value. Assuming normal distributions for the signal and the
prior, the posterior expectation of confidence is then a weighted average of the
prior and the signal lying necessarily between these two values. Thus, if the
task was easier than expected, the signal tends to be higher than the prior.
The attraction of the prior pulls reported confidence below the high signal,
hence below true performance on average since the signal is drawn from an
unbiased distribution. While rational-Bayesian models like Moore and Healy
(2008) may account for learning over experience, they fail to predict limited
discrimination, miscalibration of confidence before completion of the task, or
the absence of global learning. Therefore, we add to the Bayesian model a cru-
cial but hidden aspect of behavior under risk or uncertainty, that is doubt. We
describe the behavior of subjects who are uncertain of their true probability
of success and become consequently vulnerable to prediction errors and cog-
nitive illusions if they rely essentially on what they perceive sequentially. We
designate these subjects as "intuitive Bayesians". It turns out, unexpectedly,
that the same model also predicts the overprecision bias of confidence, which
we consider as a further confirmation of its validity.
Intuitive Bayesians may miscalibrate their own probability of success even
if they have an unbiased estimate of their own ability to succeed. This can occur
if they are uncertain of the true probability of success because they can be
misled by "available" illusory signals triggered by their doubt. The direction of
doubt is entirely different depending on whether their prior estimate led them
to believe that they would fail or that they would succeed. We thus distinguish
miscalibration among those individuals who should normally believe that they
should not perform the task and those who should normally believe that they
should.
To facilitate intuition, let us first consider a subject who is almost sure to
succeed a task, either because the task is easy or because the subject has high-
ability (H ). However, the "availability" of a possible failure acts like a negative
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signal which leads to overweighting this possibility (Tversky and Kahneman,
1973), and underweighting her subjective probability of success16 EpH , i.e.
underconfidence:
qH = µEpH + (1− µ)0 = µEpH ≤ EpH , (1)
with 0 < µ ≤ 1
Even though high-ability agents are almost sure of succeeding the training
level, their confidence is way below 1, confirming the Dunning-Kruger effect
where high-ability subjects underestimate their abilities. An estimate of this
undercalibration bias for an easy task is derived from Figure 3a:
µH(training level) =
0.79
0.98
= 0.806 ∼= qH(training level)
The undercalibration bias is: 1− 0.806 = 0.194.
However, underweighting a high probability of success need not reverse the
intention of doubling. Indeed, taking the expected value as the decision crite-
rion, among 167 "able" subjects who should double if objective probabilities
are used for computation, 158 (i.e. 94.6%) still intended to double according
to the subjective confidence reported before the game17.
At the other end of the spectrum, consider now a subject who is almost
sure of failing, either because the task is very difficult or because the subject
has low-ability (L). However, the "availability" of a possible success leads to
overweighting her subjective probability of success EpL i.e. overconfidence:
qL = µEpL + (1− µ)1 ≥ EpL, (2)
with 0 < µ ≤ 1
Thus, even though low ability agents should give up a difficult task, they are
overconfident and are thus tempted by the returns to success18. In the limit,
confidence remains positive if one is almost certain to fail. This means that
low-ability individuals always exhibit a positive bottom confidence, which is
in line with the Dunning-Kruger effect (they overestimate their abilities). An
estimate of this overcalibration bias for the high level is derived from Figure
3c:
1− µL(high level) =
0.34− 0.01
1− 0.01 = 0.333
∼= qL(high level)
16 The time t = (1, 5, 10) when confidence is reported is omitted in this sub-section to
alleviate notations.
17 Very close numbers are obtained for all calibration biases with confidence reported
during the game.
18 This should not be confounded with motivated inference as it applies symmetrically to
undesirable and desirable outcomes.
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Similarly, the overcalibration bias for the middle level is derived from Figure
3b:
1− µ′L(middle level) =
0.45− 0.04
1− 0.04 = 0.427
∼= qL(middle level)
Notice that the overcalibration bias is about twice as large as the under-
calibration bias. Hence, taking the expected value as the decision criterion,
among 190 "unable" subjects who should quit if objective probabilities are
used for computation, 159 (i.e. 83.7%) intended to double according to the
subjective confidence reported before the game.
To sum up, we explain both the hard-easy effect and the ability effect by
an availability bias triggered by the doubt about one’s possibility to fail a
relatively easy task (underconfidence) or to succeed a relatively difficult task
(overconfidence). If probabilities are updated in a Bayesian fashion, the cali-
bration bias is the relative precision of the illusory signal. The latter is inversely
related with the absolute precision of the prior estimate and positively related
with the absolute precision of the illusory signal. Thus, we mustn’t be sur-
prised to find that our estimate of the calibration bias is lower for the training
level (19.4%) than for upper levels (42.7% and 33.3% respectively) because
experience in the first rounds of the training level must be more relevant for
predicting the probability of success in the training level than in subsequent
levels. And, when comparing upper levels, the illusion of success should be
more credible for the near future (middle level) than for the more distant
future (high level).
This explanation is also consistent with the other measures displayed by
Figures 3a, 3b, 3c, given the fact that they aggregate overconfident sub-
jects who should not undertake the task with underconfident subjects who
should undertake it19. If λL is the proportion who should stop and λH the
proportion who should continue (λL + λH ≡ 1), the average confidence is:
λL(µEpL+1−µ)+λHµEpH = µEp+(1−µ)λL. Confidence is overcalibrated
on average iff λL > Ep and undercalibrated iff the reverse condition holds. The
apparent overcalibration of confidence for a difficult task takes less extreme
values when the average measured ability of the group rises. For instance, the
results displayed by Figure 3c are consistent with our estimate for the overcal-
ibration bias if the proportion of successful middle-ability subjects is 12% and
that of successful high-ability subjects is 25%, since these two predicted values
are close to the observed frequency of success in these groups, respectively 10%
and 27%.
Remarkably, this simple model of miscalibration also predicts limited dis-
crimination. Although Wall is more difficult than Hill at the middle level,
19 The rational decision to undertake a non-trivial task of level l (with a possibility to
fail and regret) is subjective. The economic criterion for making this decision rests on the
comparison of the expected utilities of all options conditional on the estimated probabilities
of success at the time of decision. A rational subject should refuse the task if the expected
utility of continuing to level l or above is no higher than the expected utility of stopping
before level l. We make use of this criterion for writing equations 6 and 7 in the next
sub-section (5.1).
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our subjects attributed on average about the same confidence level to both
tasks (see table 1). High-ability subjects who should double at middle level
in the Wall condition, and low-ability subjects who should stop before middle
level in the Hill condition would both estimate their chances of success to be
higher with 16 anagrams to solve with Hill than with 20 anagrams with Wall.
The former would underestimate their chances according to (1) and the latter
would overestimate them according to (2), but the difference between the two
estimates would be the same, equal to µ(EpHill −EpWall). Thus, if their prior
estimates were unbiased, intuitive (s.t. µ < 1) high and low-ability subjects
would imperfectly discriminate between Hill and Wall by underestimating the
difficulty gap between them. Things are even worse for middle-ability subjects
who should opt for middle level under Hill and quit before middle level under
Wall. According to (1) and (2), those individuals would have a low estimate
(µEpHill) of their pass rate under Hill and a high estimate (EpWall + 1 − µ)
under Wall. They would then underestimate the difficulty gap more severely
than high or low-ability subjects and they might even give a higher estimate
under Wall than under Hill20 iff EpHill −EpWall < ((1−µ)/µ). Therefore, our
model implies limited discrimination of differences in difficulty by intuitive
Bayesians when the difference is not very salient.
A further implication of Bayesian updating is that, in the subject’s mind,
the precision of the posterior estimate for probabilities of success, i.e. confi-
dence in her estimate, is increased by reception of the illusory signal, whatever
the latter may be21. Therefore, our theory of confidence predicts the overpre-
cision phenomenon even before completion of the task. In contrast with the
other distortions of confidence, underprecision will never be observed, a pre-
diction which is corroborated by Moore and Healy (2008) who do not quote
any study in their discussion of "underprecision". The overestimation of the
precision of acquired knowledge is an additional manifestation of the hidden
search undertaken by intuitive Bayesians. Our analysis of overprecision is con-
gruent with the observation that greater overconfidence of this kind was found
for tasks in which subjects considered they were more competent (Heath and
Tversky, 1991).
5 Predicting confidence biases and learning
5.1 Confidence updating by intuitive Bayesians
In our experiment, confidence is reported prior to the task E1p, after four
rounds E5p, and after nine rounds (only for doublers) E10p.
After going through four rounds of anagrams, a number of cues on the
task have been received and processed. Participants may recall how many
20 It is assumed here, as in Table 1, that the two estimates are independent.
21 If νi denotes the prior precision of subject I′s estimate of her future success (omitting
level l for simplicity) νi + 1 ≡ Φi will be the posterior precision after reception of an i.i.d.
signal. Thus, Φi > νi. Notice that µi = νiνi+1 .
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anagrams they solved in each round and in the aggregate, whether they would
have passed the test in each round or on the whole at this stage of the task,
whether their performance improved or declined from one round to the next,
how fast they could solve anagrams, and so forth. For the purpose of decision-
making, cues are converted into a discrete set of i.i.d. Bernoulli variables taking
value 1 if they signal to the individual that she should reach her goal for level
l (l = 1, 2, 3), and 0 otherwise. The single parameter of the Bernoulli variable
is its mean which defines the expected likelihood of success. However, this
mean is essentially unknown to that individual. Thus, let it be denoted by
p˜ which is randomly distributed within the interval [0, 1]. Assume that the
prior distribution of p˜ is a Beta-distribution with a reported mean E1p and
precision ν.
Behaving like intuitive Bayesians, participants update their prior expecta-
tion of success at level l (l = 1, 2, 3) before the training session E1pl in the
following manner (see DeGroot 1970, Chapter 9):
E5pl =
νl
νl + τ4l
E1pl +
1
νl + τ4l
X1−4;l (3)
with τ4l > 0 designating the precision of all the independent cues perceived
during the first four rounds, and X1−4;l defining the number of independent
cues predicting future success at level l at this stage of the task. They also
update the precision of the posterior expectation E5pl, which rises from ν1l
to:
ν5l = ν1l + τ4l (3’)
with 0 ≤ X1−4,l ≤ τ4l.
Equation (3) cannot be directly estimated on the data because the es-
timated probabilities E1pl and E5pl are unobservable. However, it may be
rewritten concisely in terms of reported confidence q1(l) and q5(l) with the
help of the miscalibration equations (1) and (2). Let us express generally the
Bayesian transformation of the probability estimates into confidence as:
q5(l) = µ5lE5pl + (1− µ5l)D5,l , l = (1, 2, 3) (4)
with µ5l = νl+τ4lνl+τ4l+1 and
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D(5,l) =
{
1 if maxEU(l′ | E5pl′ , l′ = (0, · · · l − 1)) ≥ maxEU(l′′ | E5pl′′ , l′′ = (l, · · · , 3))
0 otherwise.
Confidence is merely a weighted average of the prior forecast and a doubt
term acting as a contrarian Bernoulli signal.
And likewise:
22 In order to have an unambiguous definition of D(5,l) and D(1,l) below, we use the
expected utility (EU) criterion, as explained in note 19.
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q1(l) = µ1lE1pl + (1− µ1l)D1,l (5)
with µ1l = νlνl+1 and
D(1,l) =
{
1 if maxEU(l′ | E1pl′ , l′ = (0, · · · l − 1)) ≥ maxEU(l′′ | E1pl′′ , l′′ = (l, · · · , 3))
0 otherwise.
Combining (3), (4) and (5), we get:
q5(l) =
νl + 1
νl + τ4l + 1
q1(l) +
1
νl + τ4l + 1
X1−4,l +
1
νl + τ4l + 1
(D5,l −D1,l) (6)
By the same reasoning, we can express the confidence of doublers for upper
levels l = (2, 3) as:
q10(l) =
νl + τ4l + 1
νl + τ9l + 1
q5(l)+
1
νl + τ9l + 1
X5−9,l+
1
νl + τ9l + 1
(D9,l−D5,l) (7)
with τ9l ≥ τ4l designating the precision of all of the independent cues perceived
during the training level (9 rounds), νl + τ9l the precision of the posterior
expectation E10pl, and X defining the number of independent cues predicting
future success at level l at this stage of the task.
Equations (6) and (7) are essentially the same with a moving prior of in-
creasing precision. In the absence of miscalibration, confidence reported before
round t(t = (5, 10)) would be a weighted average of prior confidence and the
mean frequency of cues predicting future success at level l since the last time
confidence was reported. With miscalibration, another term is added which
can only take three values, reflecting the occurrence and direction of change
in subjects’ estimated ability with experience. If experience confirms the prior
intention to stop or continue to level l, this additional term takes value 0 and
confidence is predicted by the rational-Bayesian model (with perfect calibra-
tion). However, if experience disconfirms the prior intention to stop or continue
to level l, confidence rises above this reference value with disappointing expe-
rience and declines symmetrically below this reference value with encouraging
experience. Thus, our model predicts that intuitive Bayesians be conservative
and under-react symmetrically to negative experience (by diminishing their
confidence less than they should) and to positive experience (by raising their
confidence less than they should). Below, we report indeed rather small vari-
ations of confidence in our experiment in the form of local, but not global,
learning.
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5.2 Regression analysis
The models of Bayesian estimation of confidence described by equations (6)
and (7) are tested by an OLS in Tables 4 and 523 respectively. Reported
confidence in participant i’s ability to reach one level of the double-or-quits
game is regressed in Table 4 (Table 5) on the confidence that she reported
before the first (fifth) round and on a vector Zli of level-specific cues observable
in the first four (last five) rounds, assuming that X1−4,li(X5−9,li) = βlZli+ li
where βl is a vector of coefficients and li an error term of zero mean. Two
dummy variables for the hill and choice treatments (wall as reference) have
been added to the regression.
Table 4 OLS estimation of the Bayesian model of confidence before round 5
Training Level Middle Level High Level
Confidence before training session 0.79∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗
Freq. of rounds with 4 anagrams solved 0.14∗∗∗ 0.06ns 0.01ns
Freq. of rounds with 5- 6 anagrams solved 0.29∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
Freq. of rounds with non-declining performance 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
Anagrams solved per minute on rounds 1-4 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
Hill 0.03∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.03∗
Choice 0.01ns 0.02ns 0.00ns
Constant −0.25∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗
R2 67% 70% 76%
Observations 410 410 410
Notes. Significance level: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01, ns: not significant at 10%
level. Variables: Frequency of rounds with non-declining performance represents the percentage
of rounds (in rounds 2-4) in which number of anagrams solved was equal or higher than in the
previous round, it takes four values (0,.33,.67,1). Hill and Choice: dummy variables with Wall as
reference.
The regressions confirm the existence of local learning. Subjects did revise
their expectations with experience of the task as several cues have highly sig-
nificant coefficients (at 1% level) with the right sign. Moreover, they analyze
their own performance correctly by setting stronger pre-requisites for them-
selves when the task gets more difficult. For example, their ability to solve
just four anagrams per round in the training period increases their confidence
for this period only because, if such performance is enough to ensure success
in this period, it is no longer sufficient when the task becomes more difficult.
Another interesting result in Table 5 consistent with the miscalibration term
in equation (7) concerns low achievers who double. The later they ended up
solving the required number of anagrams in the training period, the more
abruptly their confidence rose. It is indeed an implication of subjects’ vul-
nerability to illusory signals that low-ability doublers find themselves almost
as confident as high-ability doublers in spite of widely different performances.
This result appears too on Figures 4 and 5, where the ability-adjusted con-
23 The discrete value of confidence between 0 and 100 can be safely treated as continuous.
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Table 5 OLS estimation of the Bayesian model of confidence for doublers reported before
the middle level
Middle Level High Level
Confidence after round 4 0.772∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗
Freq. of rounds with 4 anagrams solved (5-9) 0.017ns −0.024ns
Freq. of rounds with 5- 6 anagrams solved (5-9) 0.120∗∗∗ 0.073∗
Freq. of rounds with non-declining performance (5-9) 0.034ns 0.088∗∗
Number of rounds used to solve 36 anagrams 0.027∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗
Anagrams solved per minute on rounds 5-9 0.003ns −0.003ns
Hill −0.047∗∗∗ −0.022ns
Choice −0.017ns 0.022ns
Constant −0.136ns −0.186∗∗
R2 74% 81%
Observations 275 275
Notes. Significance level: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01, ns: not significant at 10%
level. Variables: Frequency of rounds with non-declining performance represents the percentage
of rounds (in rounds 5-9) in which number of anagrams solved was equal or higher than in the
previous round. Hill and Choice: dummy variables with Wall as reference. Number of rounds used
to solve 36 anagrams (between rounds 6 and 9). (5-9) refers to measures between rounds 5 and 9.
fidence of low-ability doublers jumps from bottom to top during the second
stage of the training period.
A major testable implication of the Bayesian model lies in the coefficient
of the prior confidence, which must be interpreted as the precision of prior
information relative to the information collected by experience of the task
during the training period. This coefficient is always high in Tables 4 and 5
with a minimum value of 0.77. Observing such high weights for the prior favors
the hypothesis of rational-Bayesian updating over adaptive expectations as
the latter would considerably underweight the prior relative to the evidence
accumulated in the first four rounds. Successful experience of the easier task
in the early rounds is expected to be more predictive of final success on the
same task than in future tasks of greater difficulty. Thus, the relative weight
of experience should diminish in the confidence equation at increasing levels
or, equivalently, the relative weight of prior confidence should rise. Indeed, the
coefficient of prior confidence increases continuously with the level. It rises from
0.79 to 0.86 and 0.90 in Table 4; and, from 0.77 to 0.87 in Table 5. In parallel,
the coefficients of cues signaling a successful experience continuously diminish
when the level rises. We can use the mathematical expressions of the two
coefficients of prior confidence derived from equations (6) and (7) to calculate
the precision of early experience relative to prior confidence (before the task)
τ4l
νl
(l = 1, 2, 3). With the data of Table 4, we get 0.266 for the training level,
0.163 for the middle level, and 0.111 for the high level. Similarly, we compute
the precision of late experience relative to prior confidence (before the task) τ9lνl
(l = 2, 3). With the data of Table 5, we get 0.506 for middle level and 0.274 for
high level. The impact of learning from experience appears to be substantial
and with increasing returns. By elimination of νl, we finally calculate the
precision of early experience relative to total experience during the training
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period τ4lτ9l (l = 2, 3). We obtain 0.322 for middle level and 0.405 for high level.
The rate of increase of precision resulting from longer experience (from 4 to 9
rounds) τ9l−τ4lτ4l reaches a considerable 211% at middle level and 147% at high
level, which forms indirect evidence of the overprecision phenomenon.
5.3 Why do intuitive Bayesians make wrong (and costly) predictions of
performance?
The answer to this important question, and to the related planning fallacy, is
contained in Table 6, which uses the same set of potential predictors to forecast
confidence in succeeding the middle level after doubling and ex post chances
of success24: prior confidence, ability, and performance cues observed subse-
quently (during rounds 5 to 9). The mere comparison of coefficients between
the two columns of Table 6 demonstrates that posterior confidence is based on
both objective performance cues and subjective variables, whereas the chances
of success are predicted by the objective performance cues and ability only.
The latter are the frequencies of rounds with 4 and with 5-6 anagrams solved
respectively (effort) and the speed of anagram resolution (ability); and the
subjective variables are essentially the prior confidence and the illusory signal
given to low achievers by their (lucky) initial success. Remarkably, the number
of rounds needed for solving 36 anagrams (varying from 6 to 9), which indi-
cates low achievement and recommends quitting the game at an early stage,
acts as an illusory signal with a significantly positive effect on confidence in
column 1; but the same variable acts as a correlate of low ability in column 2
with a strong negative effect on the chances of success at middle level. Indeed,
the subjective predictors of posterior confidence do not predict success when
the objective performance cues are held constant. Prior confidence predicts
the posterior confidence that conditions the decision to double25 but fails to
predict success because it is based on an intuitive reasoning which suffers from
systematic biases. Past errors convey to the prior through the aggregation pro-
cedure of Bayesian calculus and may add up with further errors caused by the
perception of illusory signals.
To reinforce our demonstration, we used the regressions listed in Table 6 to
predict normative (based on rational expectations) and subjective (confidence-
based) expected values26 and determine the best choice of doubling or quitting
prescribed by those alternative models. As expected, the normative model’s
24 We used an OLS to predict probabilities of success so as to make the comparison with
confidence transparent. Estimating an OLS instead of a Probit in columns 3 and 4 didn’t
affect the qualitative conclusions.
25 Conditional on initial success, prior confidence is a good predictor of the future decision
to double (regression not shown). This is good news for the quality of confidence reports;
and it confirms that subjects behave as intuitive Bayesians who rely on their own subjective
estimates of success to make the choice of doubling.
26 The predicted values were computed on regressions containing only the significant vari-
ables. We checked that these values stayed close to predictions derived from the regressions
listed in Table 6 which contain non significant variables too.
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Table 6 Estimation of posterior confidence (after doubling) and ex post chances of success
at the middle level
Level 2
Confidence After Chances of success
Confidence after round 4 0.778∗∗∗ 0.034ns
Freq. of rounds with 4 anagrams solved (5-9) 0.014ns 0.276∗
Freq. of rounds with 5- 6 anagrams solved (5-9) 0.107∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗
Freq. of rounds with non-declining performance (5-9) 0.043ns −0.036ns
Number of rounds used to solve 36 anagrams 0.024∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗
Anagrams solved per minute on rounds 5-9 0.009ns 0.070∗∗∗
Ability −0.007ns 0.062∗∗∗
Hill −0.046∗∗∗ 0.097ns
Choice −0.018ns −0.100∗
Constant −0.106ns 0.598∗
R2 74% 30%
Observations 275 275
Notes. Sample: to be comparable, these regressions consider only those who succeeded first level
and decided to double to second level. Significance level: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01,
ns: not significant at 10% level. Variables: Frequency of rounds with non-declining performance
represents the percentage of rounds (in rounds 5-9) in which number of anagrams solved was equal
or higher than in the previous round. Hill and Choice: dummy variables with Wall as reference.
Number of rounds used to solve 36 anagrams (between rounds 6 and 9). (5-9) refers to measures
between rounds 5 and 9. Number of rounds used to solve 36 anagrams (between rounds 6 and 9).
predictions (based on the true -ex post- probabilities) deviate farther from
reality than the subjective model’s: 48% versus 17% of the time. However,
the confidence-based prescriptions have no information value since the rate of
failure is the same whether one follows the prescription (69%) or not (70%). By
contrast, the normative prescriptions have great value since the rate of failure
is 52% for those who respect them versus 88% for those who don’t. Finally,
Table 7 divides the sample of doublers in four categories: 47% are able and
calibrated, 12% are unable and calibrated, 36% are overconfident and 5% are
underconfident. Rates of failure are markedly different among these categories:
52% only for the able calibrated, 57% for the (able) underconfident, 78% for
the unable calibrated and 91% for the (unable) overconfident! Undeniably,
the prevalence of miscalibration among doublers is substantial and its cost in
terms of failure is massive.
Table 7 The prevalence and cost of miscalibration among doublers
Presciption of subjective Prescription of normative Rate of
expected value expected value Category Share failure
double double able and calibrated 47% 52%
stop stop unable and calibrated 12% 78%
double stop overconfident 36% 91%
stop double underconfident 5% 57%
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6 Conclusion
We designed an experimental analog to the popular double-or-quits game to
compare the speed of learning one’s ability to perform a task in isolation with
the speed of rising confidence as the task gets increasingly difficult. In simple
words, we found that people on average learn to be overconfident faster than
they learn their true ability. We present a new intuitive-Bayesian model of con-
fidence which integrates confidence biases and learning. The distinctive feature
of our model of self-confidence is that it rests solely on a Bayesian representa-
tion of the cognitive process: intuitive people predict their own probability of
performing a task on the basis of cues and contrarian illusory signals related to
the task that they perceive sequentially. Confidence biases arise in our opinion,
not from an irrationality of the treatment of information, but from the poor
quality and subjectivity of the information being treated. For instance, we rule
out self-attribution biases, motivated cognition, self-image concerns and ma-
nipulation of beliefs but we describe people as being fundamentally uncertain
of their future performance and taking all the information they can get with
limited discrimination, including cognitive illusions. Above all, a persistent
doubt about their true ability is responsible for their perception of contrarian
illusory signals that make them believe, either in their possible failure if they
should succeed or in their possible success if they should fail.
Our intuitive-Bayesian theory of estimation combines parsimoniously the
cognitive bias and the learning approach. It brings a novel interpretation of
the cognitive bias and it provides a general account of estimation biases. In-
deed, we did not attribute confidence biases to specific cognitive errors but
to the fundamental uncertainty about one’s true ability; and we predicted
phenomena beyond the hard-easy and Dunning-Kruger effect which could not
be explained all together by previous models: miscalibration and overpreci-
sion before completion of the task, limited discrimination, conservatism, slow
learning and planning fallacy. Moreover, we showed that these biases are likely
to persist since the Bayesian aggregation of past information consolidates the
accumulation of errors, and the perception of illusory signals generates con-
servatism and under-reaction to events. Taken together, these two features
may explain why intuitive Bayesians make systematically wrong and costly
predictions of their own performance. Don’t we systematically underestimate
the time needed to perform a new (difficult) task and never seem to learn?
Our analysis of overconfidence is restricted to the overestimation bias. The
latter must be carefully distinguished from the overplacement bias since the
hard-easy effect that we observed here with absolute confidence has often been
reversed when observing relative confidence: overplacement for an easy task
(like driving one’s car) and underplacement for a novel or difficult task. The
reasons for overplacement are probably not unique and context-dependent.
When people really compete, the over (under) placement bias may result from
their observing and knowing their own ability (although imperfectly) better
than others’. If both high-ability and low-ability individuals compare them-
selves with average-ability others, the former are likely to experience overplace-
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ment and the latter underplacement. The same reasoning applies to individuals
familiar or unfamiliar with the task, and to individuals who were initially suc-
cessful or unsuccessful with the task. When no real competition is involved,
the overplacement effect relates to an evaluation-based estimate of probability.
While there is an underlying choice to be made in the estimation task, no such
thing is present in the latter case. If I ask you whether you consider your-
self as a top driver (relative to others), I don’t generally expect you to show
me how you drive. Preference reversals are not uncommon between choices
and evaluations (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971). Thus, the present analysis of
overestimation is consistent with reasonable explanations of overplacement.
Moreover, it predicts the overprecision phenomenon and even rules out under-
precision. This demonstrates that overestimation and overprecision are related
but different biases.
Double-or-quits-type behavior can be found in many important decisions
like addictive gambling (Goodie, 2005), military conquests (Johnson, 2004),
business expansion (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), speculative behavior (Shiller,
2000), educational choices (Breen, 2001), etc. Overconfident players, chiefs, en-
trepreneurs, traders, or students are inclined to take excessive risks; they are
unable to stop at the right time and eventually fail more than well-calibrated
persons27 (e.g., Barber and Odean 2001, Camerer and Lovallo 1999). In con-
trast, under-confident individuals won’t take enough risks and stay perma-
nently out of successful endeavors.
On the theoretical side, the intuitive-Bayesian model of confidence before
completion of a task creates a link between confidence and decision analyses
and their respective biases. Confidence biases and the anomalies of decision
under risk or uncertainty can be analyzed with the same tools. The estimation
of one’s ability implies an implicit comparison between an uncertain binary
lottery and a reference outcome. It is a by-product of the question: should I
double or quit? This is a question of interest to behavioral and decision theo-
rists.
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Appendix
Fig. 7 Example of the task screen
Legend:
A: Actual round (round 5 in this example).
B: List of anagrams to be decoded.
C: Fields to type the correct word.
D: Feedback. The "OK" appears when the solution for the anagram is correct.
E: Number of correct anagrams in the current round.
F: Total anagrams to be decoded in the current round, 6 in this example (first level).
G: Number of cumulated correct anagrams, including the current and previous rounds.
H: Number of correct anagrams required to solve the current level, in this example 36 (first
level).
I: Remaining time. The total time is 8 minutes, we show only the 3 last minutes.
J: Button to go to next round. Participants can pass to next round without clearing all
anagrams in the current level, but they cannot come back once they pushed the button.
